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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Daniel Chippewa timely appeals from the district court's order revoking probation. 
On appeal, Mr. Chippewa argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due 
process and equal protection when it refused to augment the record with various 
transcripts he requested be added to the record on appeal. Additionally, Mr. Chippewa 
argues that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to reduce his sentence 
sua sponte upon revoking probation and when it denied his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion requesting leniency. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Chippewa was charged, by Information, with DUI and a felony enhancement. 
(R., pp.58-59.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Chippewa pleaded guilty to a felony 
DUI and, in return, the State agreed to recommend probation. (R., pp.62-64.) Prior to 
sentencing, Mr. Chippewa was accepted into the Bingham County drug court. 
(R., p.81.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of nine years, with 
six years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Chippewa on probation with 
one of the conditions of probation being satisfactory completion of drug court. 
(R., pp.83-85, 87-90.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation alleging 
that Mr. Chippewa violated the terms of his probation. (R., pp.102-103.) Mr. Chippewa 
admitted to violating the terms of his probation for changing his residence without 
permission, absconding, failing to report to drug court, failing to contact his probation 
officer, using Nyquil without permission, failing to report to treatment appointments, and 
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failing to abide by curfew. (R., pp.102-10, 111-112.) The district court revoked 
probation and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.117-118.) Upon review of Mr. Chippewa's 
period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the district court suspended the 
sentence and placed him on probation. (R., p.126, 135-137.) 
After a second period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation 
alleging that Mr. Chippewa violated the terms of his probation. (R., pp.141-142.) 
Mr. Chippewa admitted to violating the terms of his probation for consuming alcohol, 
consuming alcohol while driving, and driving without privileges. (R., pp.141-142, 150-
151.) The district court revoked probation and executed the underlying sentence. 
(R., pp.152-153.) 
Mr. Chippewa filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency, which was denied by 
the district court. (R., pp.155, 161.) 
Mr. Chippewa filed a post-conviction action alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel for his trial counsel's failure adhere to Mr. Chippewa's request to appeal from 
the order revoking probation and the order denying Mr. Chippewa's Rule 35 motion. 
(R, pp.163-165, 167-168.) The district court granted Mr. Chippewa's request for post 
conviction relief and re-issued the order revoking probation and its order denying 
Mr. Chippewa's Rule 35 motion, thereby restoring Mr. Chippewa's appellate rights. 
(R, pp.163-165, 167-168.) Mr. Chippewa timely appealed from both the district court's 
order revoking probation and the order denying his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.170-171.) 
On appeal, Mr. Chippewa filed a motion to augment the record with various 
transcripts. (Motion to Augment, pp.1-3.) The State objected in part to Mr. Chippewa's 
request for the transcripts. (Objection to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the 
1 Mr. Chippewa is not challenging the denial of his Rule 35 motion on appeal. 
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Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof" (hereinafter, Objection to Motion 
to Augment), pp.1-5.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order denying 
his request for transcripts of the change of plea hearing held on August 31, 2009, the 
sentencing hearing held on December 7, 2009, the admit/deny hearing held on June 21, 
2010, the disposition hearing held on July 19, 2010, and the rider review hearing held 
on January 31, 2011. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule. (hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to Augment), pp.1 .) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Chippewa due process and equal 
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with transcripts necessary for 
review of the issues on appeal? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce his sentence 
sua sponte upon revoking probation? 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Chippewa's Rule 35 
motion in light of his request for the court to retain jurisdiction as an alternative to 
the execution of his sentence? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Deny Mr. Chippewa Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied His Motion To Augment With Transcripts Necessary For Review Of The 
Issues On Appeal 
A. Introduction 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent 
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the 
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need 
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant 
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to 
the issues on appeal or if a sufficient substitute for the transcript exists. 
In this case the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Chippewa's request for 
transcripts of the change of plea hearing held on August 31, 2009, the sentencing 
hearing held on December 7, 2009, the admit/deny hearing held on June 21, 2010, the 
disposition hearing held on July 19, 2010, and the rider review hearing held on 
January 31, 2011. On appeal, Mr. Chippewa is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's 
denial of his request for these transcripts. Mr. Chippewa asserts that the requested 
transcripts are relevant to the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion 
when it failed to reduce his sentence sua sponte upon revoking probation because the 
applicable standard of review requires an appellate court to conduct an independent 
review of the entirety of the proceedings in order to evaluate the district court's 
sentencing decisions. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his 
request. 
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B. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Chippewa With Access To 
The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process And Equal Protection 
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merits Based Appellate Review Of His Sentencing 
Claims 
The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. art. 
I§ 1 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." Lassiter 
v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U 18, 24 ( 1981). 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States 
Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, Dept. of 
Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See 
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a relevant 
transcript, the transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-
863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates 
the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. I.C.R. 5.2(a). 
Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court .. 
. . " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to 
be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as 
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a). 
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An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment 
affecting substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct. App. 1983). Additionally, an appeal from the denial of an Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) 
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion is an appeal as of right as defined by Idaho Appellate Rule 
11 (9). See State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding an order denying a 
motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is an appealable order pursuant to 
I.AR. 11 (c)(6)). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of opinions directly 
addressing whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these cases. 
The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection 
clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent defendants 
and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second theme limits the 
states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review. The states do 
not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request. In order to meet 
the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the states must 
provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless some or all of the 
requested material are unnecessary or frivolous. 
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that time, 
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the State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been 
sentenced to death, but required in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts 
themselves. Id. 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was 
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants 
was a denial of due process and equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on equal footing before the bar of 
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discrfminate on account of poverty 
than on the account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold 
as follows: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny 
the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all But that is not to say that a State 
that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that discriminates 
against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty. Appellate 
review has now become an integral part of the Illinois trial system for 
finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Consequently at 
all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional mandates of both due 
process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be provided with a record 
which facilitates an effective, merits-related appellate review. At the same time, the 
Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary in instances where 
a less expensive, yet accurate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
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In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court 
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of the defendant's indigency. The 
United States Supreme Court held that "once the State chooses to establish appellate 
review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that 
because of their poverty." Id. at 257. 'This principle is no less applicable 
where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its 
appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of that 
procedure solely because of his indigency." Id. 
In Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure determining whether access to transcripts based on a frivolousness 
standard. "Under the present standard, .... they must convince the trial judge that 
their contentions of error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary 
to prosecute their appeal." Draper, 327 U.S. at 494. The Court first expanded upon its 
holding in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent 
alternative is available, by adding a relevancy requirement stating that "part or all of the 
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised on 
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The 
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be 
adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial 
proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
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Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ), extended the Griffin protections 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it held "where the grounds of appeal ... make out a colorable need 
for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the 
transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds. Id at 
195. 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardner v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
If the record establishes that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issues 
on appeal, due process and equal protection mandate that those transcripts be created 
at the public's expense, unless the State can prove that the requested transcripts are 
not relevant to the issues on appeal. 
C. The Requested Transcripts Are Relevant To Mr. Chippewa's Appeal Because He 
Is Challenging The Length Of His Sentence And The Applicable Standard Of 
Review Requires An Appellate Court To Independently Review The Entire 
Record Before The District Court 
The requested transcripts are necessary for review of the issue raised in this 
appeal because they are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of review. "When we 
review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will 
examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. 
We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as 
events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." 
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State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added). In other 
words, an appellate court reviewing a district court's sentencing decision conducts an 
independent review of the entire record to determine if the record supports the district 
court's sentencing decisions. This standard of review is necessary in Idaho because 
judges are not required to state their sentencing rationale on the record. State v. Nield, 
106 Idaho 665, 666 (1984). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, 
1 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), which addressed the scope of review of an appeal filed 
from an order revoking probation. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was 
placed on probation. Id. at 619. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to 
violating the terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation, but retained 
jurisdiction. Id. at 619-620. The defendant subsequently admitted to violating the terms 
of his probation and the district court revoked probation. Id. The defendant appealed 
from the district court's second order revoking probation. Id. 
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with 
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied 
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the 
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal 
protection when it denied the motion to augment and whether the district court abused 
its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 620-21. The Idaho Court of Appeals held 
that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary for the appeal 
because "they were not before the district court in the second probation violation 
proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its revocation 
decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 621. The Court 
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of Appeals then clarified the scope of review for a revocation determination. 
Specifically, it held: 
[l]n reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily 
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the 
time of the revocation of probation However, that does not mean that all 
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane. 
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision 
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues 
which are properly made part of the record on appeal. 
Id. (original emphasis) (citation omitted). 
The instant case is distinguishable because Morgan only challenged the order 
revoking probation and Mr. Chippewa is challenging the length of his sentence, which 
entails an analysis of "the entire record encompassing events before and after the 
original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was 
imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation 
of probation."2 Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Furthermore, whether the transcripts of the 
2 In Morgan, the Court of Appeals refused to address Mr. Morgan's claim that the Idaho 
Supreme Court denied him due process on the basis that it does not have the power to 
overrule a decision by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. at 621. The Morgan Court went on 
to state that it would have the authority to review a renewed motion to augment if it was 
filed with the Court of Appeals after the appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals 
and contained information or argument which was not presented to the Idaho Supreme 
Court. Id. However, this position is untenable because the Idaho Appellate Rules 
require all motions to be filed directly with the Idaho Supreme Court. For example, 
Idaho Appellate Rule 110 states as follows: 
All motions, petitions, briefs and other appellate documents, other than the 
initial notice of appeal, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules with the court heading of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho as provided by Rule 6. There shall 
be no separate filings directed to or filed with the Court of Appeals. In the 
event of an assignment of a case to the Court of Appeals, the title of the 
proceeding and the identifying number thereof shall not be changed 
except that the Clerk of the Supreme Court may add additional letters or 
other notations to the case number so as to identify the assignment of the 
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requested proceedings were before the district court at the time of the probation 
revocation hearing is not germane to the question of whether the transcripts are 
relevant to the issues on appeal because, in reaching a sentencing decision, a district 
court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the hearing from which 
the appeal was filed. Rather, the court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its 
own official position and observations. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 
(Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that 
the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the court heard 
during trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could rely 
upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed 
in the courts within its judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved"), 
case. All case files shall be maintained in the office of the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court. 
(emphasis added). Furthermore, Idaho Appellate Rule 30 requires that all motions to 
augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant portions of I.AR. 30 follow: 
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the 
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record. 
Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion 
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and 
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by 
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court. 
(emphasis added). Mr. Chippewa is not aware of any court rule which allows a party to 
file a motion directly with the Court of Appeals. Idaho Appellate Rule 11 0 expressly 
prohibits such filings. Therefore, the Morgan Court's statement that Mr. Morgan could 
have filed a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is contrary to 
the Idaho Appellate Rules. Mr. Chippewa recognizes that the Idaho Court of Appeals 
has recently rejected virtually identical arguments in State v. Cornelison, 2013 
Published Opinion 22 (Ct. App. April 11, 2013). However, Cornelison is not yet final, 
and Mr. Chippewa disagrees with the holding in that case. 
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State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving sentencing court's reliance 
upon evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a previously dismissed case 
because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already knew about 
Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether the prior hearings were transcribed or not 
is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon the information is already knows from 
presiding over the prior hearings when it made the sentencing decision after revoking 
probation. 
The rationale behind this position comports with the Idaho Court of Appeals' 
reasoning in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989), where the Court 
of Appeals explained why the appellate courts should look to the entire record when 
reviewing the executed sentence: 
[W)hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has 
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two 
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution 
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially 
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The 
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events 
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing 
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a 
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant 
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked, 
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an 
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the 
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on 
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a 
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a 
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see 
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the 
appellate system cluttered with such cases. 
As such, when an appellant files an appeal from a sentence ordered after the revocation 
of probation the applicable standard of review requires an independent and 
comprehensive inquiry into the events which occurred prior to, as well as the events 
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which occurred during, the probation revocation proceedings. The basis for this 
standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite properly remembers the 
entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision." Id. It 
follows that, "[w]hen reviewing that decision, [an appellate court] should consider the 
same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not hold that the district court must expressly 
reference prior proceedings at the probation disposition hearing in order for this 
standard of review to become applicable. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals 
presumed the judge would automatically consider prejudgment events when 
determining what sentence should be executed after revoking probation. Whether the 
prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, as an appellate court will presume 
that the district court will remember and consider the events from the prior proceedings 
when it executes a sentence after revoking probation. 
In this case, Judge Simpson presided over the final disposition hearing held on 
April 4, 2011. (R., p.150.) Judge Simpson also presided over the change of plea 
hearing held on August 31, 2009, the sentencing hearing held on December 7, 2009, 
the admit/deny hearing held on June 21, 2010, and the rider review hearing held on 
January 31, 2011. (R., pp.62, 83, 111, 126.) As such, the Adams Opinion indicates 
that an appellate court will presume Judge Simpson relied on his memory of those 
proceedings when it executed Mr. Chippewa's sentences after revoking probation. 
Therefore, transcripts of those hearings will be necessary for an appellate court to 
review the merits of his appellate sentencing claims. 
Since the requested transcripts are within the applicable standard of review, the 
Idaho Supreme court's decision to deny Mr. Chippewa access to those transcripts 
constitutes a due process and equal protection violation. In Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 
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477 (1963), a transcript was necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be 
dismissed without the transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an 
appellant must provide an adequate record of face procedural default. "It is well 
established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon 
which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, .... and where 
pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the 
actions of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999); see also 
State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 
873 (Ct. App. 1985). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court 
minutes that may be sufficient so that a meaningful review of an appellant's claim is 
possible, then the transcripts are not necessary for review even though the Court of 
Appeals as "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel not rely on the district court 
minutes to provide ... [a] record for [that] Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 
489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Chippewa fails to provide the appellate court with 
transcripts necessary for review of his claim, the legal presumption will apply and 
Mr. Chippewa's sentencing claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is 
state action combined with Mr. Chippewa's indigency which prevents him from access 
to the necessary transcripts, then such action is a violation of the equal protection and 
due process clauses and any such presumption should no longer apply. 
Moreover, the foregoing presumption should be reversed in this case, and what 
occurred at those hearings should be presumed to discredit the district court's final 
sentencing decision. When Mr. Chippewa was first placed on probation and given the 
opportunity for multiple periods of probation, the district court must have found that the 
circumstances were right to give him an opportunity to be a member of society. To 
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ignore the positive factors that were present at the previous hearings presents a 
negative, one-sided view of Mr. Chippewa. Denial of access to the requested 
transcripts has prevented Mr. Chippewa from addressing those positive factors in 
support of his appellate sentencing claims. In light of that denial, Mr. Chippewa argues 
that the events which occurred at the subject hearings should be presumed to invalidate 
the district court's final sentencing decisions in this matter. 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny an indigent defendant transcripts necessary 
for a merits-based review on appeal. In this case, the requested transcripts are 
necessary to address the issues on appeal because the applicable standard of review 
of an appellate sentencing claim requires the appellate court to conduct an independent 
review of all of the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard of review, 
the focus is not on the district court's express sentencing rationale; to the contrary, the 
main question on appeal is if the record itself supports the district court's ultimate 
sentencing decision. As such, the decision to deny Mr. Chippewa's request for the 
transcripts will render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the 
missing transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions. This functions as a 
procedural bar to the review of Mr. Chippewa's appellate sentencing claims on the 
merits and, therefore, he should either be provided with the requested transcripts or the 
presumption should not be applied. Since Mr. Chippewa's request for the transcripts 
was denied, that presumption should be reversed in his favor. 
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D. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Chippewa With Access To 
The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process Because He Cannot 
Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants 
counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the Court recognized a due 
process right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. According to the United 
States Supreme Court: 
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it 
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397. 
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements 
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an 
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he 
supports his client's appeal to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the 
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is 
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is factual support either in favor of any 
argument to be made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Chippewa has not 
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obtained review of the court proceeding based on the merits and was not provided with 
effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of 
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association's "Standards For Criminal 
Justice, The Defense Function." These standards offer insight into the role and 
responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking substance. 
Standards 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's 
sentencing determination at issue. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Chippewa 
on the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal. 
Mr. Chippewa is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective counsel cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant transcripts. 
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Chippewa his constitutional rights 
to due process and equal protection which include a right to effective assistance of 
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access 
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any 
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necessary supplemental briefing raising issues or arguments which arise as a result of 
that 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Reduce Mr. Chippewa's 
Sentence Sua Sponte Upon Revoking Probation 
Mr. Chippewa asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of 
nine years, with three years fixed, is excessive. Due to the district court's power under 
I.C.R. 35 to reduce the length of the original sentence sua sponte upon the revocation 
of probation, on appeal an appellant can challenge the length of the sentence as being 
excessive. State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944 (Ct. App. 2003). Where a defendant 
contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the 
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to 
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public 
interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v.
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Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Chippewa does not allege 
that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an 
abuse of discretion, Mr. Chippewa must show that in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, 
or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
20 
There are various mitigating factors which support the conclusion that 
Mr. Chippewa's sentence is excessively harsh. Specifically, Mr. Chippewa has a 
supportive family. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.9.) 
Mr. Chippewa was grieving over his brother's death at the time he committed the 
underlying offense. (PSI, pp.12-13.) Mr. Chippewa's decision to drink alcohol was 
partially related to the grief he was experiencing due to his brother's death. (R., pp.23, 
33.) 
Mr. Chippewa's positive performance on his rider is a mitigating factor which 
indicates he is capable of rehabilitation. Mr. Chippewa performed extraordinarily well on 
his rider. Mr. Chippewa did not receive any formal or informal disciplinary sanctions on 
his rider. (PSI, p.41.) The IDOC wrote the following about his behavior: 
Mr. Chippewa has exhibited excellent behavior and is a good role 
model for others. Mr. Chippewa's ability to abide by the rules and 
regulations of NICI to this degree shows a significant potential for success 
in his community while on supervised probation. This level of self-
discipline and rule-abiding behavior is indicative of being amenable to 
treatment and supervision in the community. 
(PSI, p.41.) Mr. Chippewa was initially withdrawn from others and treatment when he 
began his rider. (PSI, p.41.) Mr. Chippewa "challenged himself" and opened up to 
treatment and other inmates. (PSI, p.41.) He got to the point where he became a "big 
help" to other inmates in his New Direction Program. (PSI, p.41.) Mr. Chippewa earned 
his GED while on his rider. (PSI, p.42.) In his GED course, Mr. Chippewa was 
considered an "excellent student." (PSI, p.42.) 
In sum, there are various mitigating factors which support the conclusion that 
Mr. Chippewa's sentence is excessively harsh. 
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111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Chippewa's Rule 35 Motion 
Requesting Leniency In Light Of His Request For The Court To Retain Jurisdiction As 
An Alternative To Execution Of His Sentence 
Mr. Chippewa argues that, under any view of the facts, that Mr. Chippewa was a 
viable candidate for the therapeutic community rider and, therefore, the district court 
erred in denying his Rule 35 motion. A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence 
under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and 
essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if the sentence originally 
imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). "The 
criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those 
applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." Id. "If the 
sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is 
excessive in view of new or additional information presented with the motion for 
reduction. Id. 
In support of his Rule 35 motion Mr. Chippewa argued that the district court 
should reconsider the revocation of his probation so he could have an opportunity to 
participate in the therapeutic community rider program. (Tr., p.12, L.24 - p.13, L.6.) 
Mindful of State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201 (2007), which held that a Rule 35 motion 
must be supported by new or additional information in order for an appellate court to 
review the denial of a Rule 35 motion, Mr. Chippewa still asserts that the district court 
abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion requesting leniency. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Chippewa respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the 
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues or arguments 
which arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Chippewa 
respectfully requests that this Court remand this case with instructions to retain 
jurisdiction. Alternatively, Mr. Chippewa respectfully requests that this Court reduce the 
fixed portion of his sentence. 
DATED this 2nd day of May, 20'13. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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